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Why European and United States drug
regulators are not speaking with one voice
on anti-influenza drugs: regulatory review
methodologies and the importance of
‘deep’ product reviews
Shai Mulinari1* and Courtney Davis2
Abstract
Background: Relenza represents the first neuraminidase inhibitor (NI), a class of drugs that also includes the drug
Tamiflu. Although heralded as breakthrough treatments in influenza, NI efficacy has remained highly controversial. A
key unsettled question is why the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved more cautious
efficacy statements in labelling than European regulators for both drugs.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative analysis of United States and European Union regulatory appraisals for
Relenza to investigate the reasons for divergent regulatory interpretations, pertaining to Relenza’s capacity to alleviate
symptoms and reduce frequency of complications of influenza.
Results: In Europe, Relenza was evaluated via the so-called national procedure with Sweden as the reference country.
We show that FDA reviewers, unlike their European (i.e. Swedish) counterpart, (1) rejected the manufacturer’s insistence
on pooling efficacy data, (2) remained wary of subgroup analyses, and (3) insisted on stringent statistical analyses.
These differences meant that the FDA was less likely to depart from prevailing regulatory and scientific standards in
interpreting trial results. We argue that the differences are explained largely by divergent institutionalised review
methodologies, i.e. the European regulator’s reliance on manufacturer-compiled summaries compared to the FDA’s
examination of original data and documentation from trials.
Conclusions: The FDA’s more probing and meticulous evaluative methodology allowed its reviewers to develop ‘deep’
knowledge concerning the clinical and statistical facets of trials, and more informed opinions regarding suitable methods
for analysing trial results. These findings challenge the current emphasis on evaluating regulatory performance mainly in
terms of speed of review. We propose that persistent uncertainty and knowledge deficits regarding NIs could have been
ameliorated had regulators engaged in the public debates over the drugs’ efficacy and explained their contrasting
methodologies and judgments. Regulators use major resources to evaluate drugs, but if regulators’ assessments are not
effectively disseminated and used, resources are used inefficiently.
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Background
The present study aims to investigate and explain conflict-
ing assessments of the anti-influenza drug Relenza
(zanamivir) made by United States and European regula-
tors. Marketed since 1999 by the British drug firm Glaxo
Wellcome (GW) (subsequently GlaxoSmithKline), Relenza
represents the first so-called neuraminidase inhibitor (NI),
a class of drugs that also includes the drug Tamiflu (osel-
tamivir). Although heralded as breakthrough treatments
[1], the efficacy of Relenza and Tamiflu have remained
highly controversial, especially after many countries
invested huge sums of money stockpiling the drugs to
safeguard public health in the event of a major influenza
outbreak [2, 3]. In particular, controversies have sur-
rounded the incongruent results from meta-analyses and
systematic reviews authored or ordered by a variety of
actors, including Health Technology Assessment bodies
[4], investigators employed or financed by the drug manu-
facturers [5–7], and non-industry funded academics [8, 9].
Whilst meta-analyses and systematic reviews are intended
to serve as key tools for evidence-based medicine [10], in
the case of the NIs, they have been a source of confusion
and contestation [11]. For example, meta-analytic esti-
mates of the drugs’ capacity to reduce the amount of
time people experience symptoms of influenza have
ranged from less than 1 day [5] to up to 2 days [4].
As a consequence, policy recommendations have also
varied, with some authors and organisations endorsing
the use of NIs and advocating national stockpiling,
while others – arriving at more conservative estimates
of efficacy – discouraged it [11, 12].
Of particular note were the conflicting statements
about the efficacy of NIs made by three of the most
prominent public health bodies in the United States,
namely the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention,
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [2],
leading one commentator to ask “Why aren’t the United
States Centers for Disease Control and Food and Drug
Administration speaking with one voice on flu?” [13]. In
the midst of these high-profile controversies, and central
to this study’s rationale, researchers and commentators
expressed bewilderment over the FDA having approved
much more cautious (and sometimes directly contradict-
ory) efficacy statements than European regulators, as
evidenced by the description of treatment effects printed
in regulator-approved drug labels [2, 8]. For example,
United States labels state that both Relenza and Tamiflu
have not been proven to reduce complications of influenza
whilst European labels claim the opposite. Similarly, the
FDA maintains that Relenza and Tamiflu have not been
shown to attenuate illness in patients at high risk of compli-
cations, but European labels claim the opposite. These con-
flicting regulatory statements regarding treatment benefits
have moved to the centre of debates because a major argu-
ment for stockpiling NIs was the anticipated effect on redu-
cing complications of influenza linked to morbidity and
death, and their assumed therapeutic benefits in some high-
risk patients [2]. Yet, curiously, the reasons underlying
United States and European regulators’ divergent interpreta-
tions of NI efficacy remain unexplored and unexplained [8].
Below, we investigate cross-national regulatory diver-
gences as they pertain to Relenza. Methodologically, the
choice of Relenza, instead of Tamiflu, for this analysis is
based on previous research showing how ‘first-in-class’
drugs may create regulatory precedents [14]; indeed,
United States and European regulators’ divergent con-
clusions are similar for Relenza and Tamiflu [8], suggest-
ing a common cause. Our analysis traces links between
regulatory agency resources, institutionalised review
methodologies, disciplinary expertise, the methods and
standards used by agency reviewers for evaluating trial
results, and regulatory outcomes in the form of particular
statements about efficacy. In brief, we argue that the FDA’s
more probing and meticulous evaluative methodology
allowed its reviewers to develop ‘deep’ knowledge concern-
ing the clinical and statistical facets of trials, and more in-
formed opinions regarding suitable methods for analysing
trial results. We also propose that persistent uncertainty
and knowledge deficits regarding NIs could have been ame-
liorated had regulators engaged in the public debates and
explained their contrasting methodologies and judgments.
Methods
We used a qualitative, cross-national comparative meth-
odology [15] to investigate divergent interpretations of
Relenza’s capacity to (1) alleviate symptoms and (2) re-
duce the frequency of complications of influenza. In the
European Union, Relenza was evaluated under the mu-
tual recognition procedure [16], with Sweden as the ref-
erence member state. We asked for and obtained
relevant regulatory documents from the Medical Prod-
ucts Agency (MPA) under the Swedish Public Access to
Information and Secrecy Act, including company sub-
missions to the MPA and regulatory reviews and prod-
uct labels (also known as the Summary of Product
Characteristics in Europe). In the United States, Relenza
was evaluated by the FDA’s Division of Antiviral Drug
Products (DAVP). From the FDA webpage we down-
loaded publically available regulatory documents. This
included the DAVP’s medical and statistical reviews and
product labels, but also memos from meetings and dis-
cussions held with the manufacturer. Our research also
involved extensive documentary data collection and ana-
lysis, including review of the scientific and ‘grey’ litera-
ture (e.g. government or public body reports) on NIs.
While the analysis of FDA and MPA regulatory docu-
ments form the backbone of this study, we also conducted
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a number of semi-structured interviews to ensure proper
understanding of the clinical research and regulatory con-
text relevant to NIs. This included interviewing a former
FDA reviewer who had participated in evaluating the
Relenza submission, as well as a senior MPA statistician
who was a long-time member of the MPA Board that
scrutinised all regulatory assessments, including at the
time of Relenza evaluation. We also interviewed three
academics that had meta-analysed the Relenza trial
programme. Despite repeated attempts, representatives of
GlaxoSmithKline and the MPA clinical assessor who
evaluated Relenza declined to be interviewed or respond
to specific queries. We acknowledge this may be a limita-
tion of the study.
Results
The Relenza submission
This section provides an overview of the evidence GW
submitted to United States and Swedish regulatory au-
thorities most relevant to deliberations about Relenza’s
capacity to alleviate symptoms and reduce frequency of
complications of influenza. The clinical development
programme for Relenza included three phase III (‘piv-
otal’) studies carried out during the 1997/1998 influenza
season. One was conducted in Europe [17], one in the
Southern Hemisphere (primarily Australia) [18], and one
in North America (primarily the United States) (unpub-
lished). Results from a number of phase II trials were
also included in the application as supporting evidence.
In addition to these treatment trials, the applications
included one (to the FDA) and seven (to the MPA) influ-
enza prevention (or prophylaxis) studies. The explan-
ation for this difference was that GW sought approval
for both indications in Sweden, but only the treatment
indication in the United States (only the treatment indi-
cation is discussed in this text).
To be recruited into Relenza treatment trials patients
had to present an ‘influenza-like illness’ defined by the
presence of (objective) fever and/or (subjective) feverish-
ness and at least two of the four following symptoms:
headache, myalgia, cough and/or sore throat. The pri-
mary endpoint, that is, the primary outcome measure in
trials, was time to alleviation of influenza symptoms. Al-
leviation was defined as no fever (temperature < 37.8 °C
and/or feverishness as none) and headache, myalgia, sore
throat and cough recorded as none or mild, and had to
be maintained over the next 24 hours. A number of pre-
specified secondary endpoints were also examined, in-
cluding, but not limited to, complications of influenza
and antibiotics use. To mimic the expected real-world
use of the drug, patients were allowed to use relief medi-
cation (paracetamol and cough suppressant) in an unre-
stricted fashion.
Although patients were recruited on the basis of
symptoms of influenza, patients’ infection status was
subsequently determined using diagnostic tests. Besides
influenza viruses, a host of other infectious agents can
produce influenza-like symptoms. Consequently, trials
recruited both influenza positive (IP) and negative pa-
tients, and together the IP and influenza negative sub-
populations made up the so-called intention-to-treat
(ITT) population. In the phase III trials, the percentage
of IP patients ranged from 71% to 77% (Table 1). This
percentage is expected to be much lower in clinical
praxis, possibly around 15%, although the exact percent-
age will vary between seasons and treatment settings [4].
Crucially, in the absence of an appropriate ‘point of care’
diagnostic test, doctors similarly base treatment deci-
sions on symptoms alone.
In addition, a ‘high-risk’ influenza positive (HR-IP)
population was delineated in trials, defined by age (≥65
years) and/or by underlying chronic condition consid-
ered to predispose the patient to a greater risk of a more
prolonged and/or severe course of illness.
Table 1 summarises GW’s main analyses in each of the
pre-specified populations with respect to the primary end-
point of time to symptom alleviation. The Southern
Hemisphere and European studies both showed conclu-
sive effects in ITT and IP populations, and favourable but
non-significant point estimates in the HR-IP group. How-
ever, despite the larger numbers (n = 777) enrolled in the
North America study, results were negative in each of the
pre-specified populations. Indeed, for the HR-IP group,
the results appear to favour placebo (–0.25 days).
Another critical issue for regulators to address was the
drug’s impact on complications of influenza (e.g. pneu-
monia, bronchitis, sinusitis) and associated antibiotics
use. Because GW argued that results in the IP popula-
tion, but not ITT population, was the best measure of
the ‘true efficacy’ of Relenza ([19], p. 30), the company
summarised results in the IP population only. Differ-
ences were small and favoured Relenza in the IP popula-
tion in all three trials (Table 2). However, the difference
between drug and placebo in reducing complications
was only statistically significant in the North American
trial, and none of the trials demonstrated a statistically
significant reduction in antibiotics use.
Differences in regulators’ interpretation of key results
Table 3 summarises Swedish/European and United States
regulators’ interpretations since 1999 of the effect of
Relenza on the duration of influenza symptoms in ITT, IP
and HR-IP populations, and Relenza’s capacity to reduce
incidences of complications in the IP population, as this
was conveyed in product labelling. A number of points
can be noted with respect to this comparison of successive
United States and European Union product labels for
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Relenza, including the fact that regulators approved directly
contradictory claims with respect to the drug’s efficacy.
The following sections address three key questions
critical to an evaluation of Relenza’s therapeutic effects,
namely drug efficacy in the ITT and IP populations,
efficacy in HR-IP groups and the drug’s impact on com-
plications of influenza, and describe how regulators
came to their sometimes diametrically opposed interpre-
tations. We show that FDA reviewers, unlike their
European (i.e. Swedish) counterpart, (1) rejected the
manufacturer’s insistence on pooling efficacy data, (2)
remained wary of subgroup analyses and (3) insisted on
stringent statistical analyses. These differences also
meant that the FDA was less likely to depart from
prevailing regulatory and scientific standards in inter-
preting results.
Efficacy in the ITT and IP populations
The FDA’s position
In accordance with standard FDA practice, a multi-
disciplinary team, including statistical and medical
reviewers and team leaders, carried out the clinical
appraisal. This involved independent, statistical analysis
of key results as well as detailed qualitative evaluations
of trial documentation, consistent with a penetrating
and meticulous regulatory review methodology. Overall,
the DAVP review team judged both Southern Hemi-
sphere and European studies to show relevant thera-
peutic effects. However, because the North American
study had only small and statistically inconclusive point
estimates, despite being very well powered, this trial was
considered to be negative (Table 1) [20].
Further, DAVP reviewers considered it especially prob-
lematic that the pivotal North American study was un-
successful, because this meant that it was “a dilemma to
try to determine a treatment effect generalisable to a
North American population” ([21], p. 2), i.e. the popula-
tion most germane to the FDA’s jurisdiction.
Adding fuel to the fire, Dr Michael Elashoff, the
DAVP’s statistical reviewer, also argued that, since the
proportion of IP patients was very high (more than 70%)
compared to the population that would be prescribed
the drug (likely less than 20%), the trials markedly
Table 2 Complications noted and use of antibiotics in influenza-
infected patients
Trial Southern Hemisphere
(NAIB3001)
Europe
(NAIB3002)
North America
(NAIA3002)
Complications
Placebo 30% 33% 22%
Zanamivir 24% 24% 15%
P value 0.24 0.125 0.049*
Antibiotics use
Placebo 28% 17% 15%
Zanamivir 26% 11% 11%
P value 0.58 0.21 0.16
*P < 0.05
Table 1 Results on the primary endpoint: median time to symptom improvement (days)
Trial Southern Hemisphere (NAIB3001) Europe (NAIB3002) North America (NAIA3002)
Intent-to-treat n = 455 n = 356 n = 777
Placebo 6.5 7.5 6.0
Relenza 5.0 5.0 5.5
Difference 1.5 2.5 0.5
95% confidence interval (0.5 to 2.25) (0.75 to 3.5) (–0.5 to 1.0)
P value 0.011* < 0.001*** 0.228
Influenza positive n = 321 (71%) n = 277 (77%) n = 569 (73%)
Placebo 6.0 7.5 6.0
Relenza 4.5 5.0 5.0
Difference 1.5 2.5 1.0
95% confidence interval (0.5 to 2.5) (1.0 to 4.0) (0 to 1.5)
P value 0.004** < 0.001*** 0.078
High-risk, influenza-positive n = 52 n = 30 n = 79
Placebo 8.3 11.5 6.0
Relenza 5.0 9.25 6.25
Difference 3.3 2.25 –0.25
95% confidence interval Not found Not found Not found
P value 0.16 0.21 0.89
*P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001
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overstated Relenza’s real-world benefit [22]. However,
this critical remark did not resonate with Elashoff ’s col-
leagues on the clinical side. Rather, the DAVP medical
reviewer, Dr Barbara Styrt, concurred with GW that
effects in the IP population were the most relevant be-
cause this addressed the drug’s activity on the target dis-
ease [20]; hence, DAVP’s efficacy appraisal centred
almost exclusively on results in IP patients, consistent
Table 3 Relenza labelling in Sweden (SWE), European Union (EU) and United States (US), 1999–2017
Label SWE March 1999 EU June 1999 EU 2001 EU 2017 US 1999 US 2017
Efficacy in IPa Relenza shortens
the time of illness
with 1–2.5 days
compared to
placebo
Relenza alleviates
the symptoms of
influenza and
reduces their
median duration
by 1.5 days (range
1.0–2.5 days)
Label updated to
include pooled
analysis showing
1.5 day (95% CI
1.0–2.0 days) of
shortening of
median time of
symptoms
Similar statement Trials in North America
suggested up to 1 day
of shortening of median
time of symptoms
compared with placebo,
although statistical
significance was not
reached; in a study
conducted in the
Southern Hemisphere,
a 1.5-day difference in
median time to
symptom improvement
was observed; additional
evidence of efficacy was
provided by the
European study
Similar
statement
Efficacy in ITTb No mention No mention No mention The difference in
time to alleviation
of symptoms was
1.0 day (95% CI
0.5–1.5) in the
combined analysis
of studies
No mention No
mention
Efficacy in HR groupsc In some studies a
more pronounced
therapeutic effect has
been seen in patients
belonging to the high-
risk groups of elderly
patients (≤ 65 years)
and patients with
some chronic diseases
of the heart and
lungs, although only
a limited number
patient in these risk
groups have been
evaluated
A limited number
of HR patients, i.e.
elderly and patients
with asthma, were
included; data are
therefore limited in
these groups of
patients
A limited number
of elderly patients
were included; data
is therefore limited
in this group Label
updated with
conclusive study
(1.5 day difference)
in IP patients with
underlying respiratory
diseases
Similar statement No consistent treatment
effect was demonstrated
in patients with
underlying chronic
medical conditions,
including respiratory or
cardiovascular disease
Similar
statement
Complicationsd No mention No mention Label updated with
pooled analysis in
the IP population
showing significant
reduction in incidence
of complications and
antibiotics use
Similar statement No consistent
differences in rate
of development of
complications were
observed
Similar
statement
aEfficacy in IP population: United States labels have consistently been the most cautious. Furthermore, unlike European labels, the United States labels do not
combine the results from trials, neither as an interval of expected effects, as in the original Swedish label (i.e. 1–2.5 days), nor by pooling studies, as in subsequent
European Union labels
bEfficacy in ITT population: Although the intended users are patients with influenza-like symptom (i.e. ITT subjects), labels consistently cite results in the IP group.
The current Europe-wide label is the exception, reporting results from a pooled analysis in the ITT population; however, the emphasis in current European Union
labelling is still on efficacy in IP subjects
cEfficacy in HR-IP groups: The original Swedish label from March 1999 professed that Relenza could be more efficacious in the elderly and some other HR subgroups.
This statement was promptly removed and it was not present in the first Europe-wide label from June 1999. However, in 2001, a statement was introduced in the
European Union label that efficacy had been demonstrated in patients with mild to moderate chronic airways disease. In contrast, FDA has maintained that no effect
has been demonstrated in HR-IP patients, including those with chronic airway disease
dComplications: FDA has maintained that no consistent effect on the incidence of complications has been demonstrated. The original Swedish and
European Union labels did not make any claims regarding effects on complications. However, since 2001, the Europe-wide label reports on a pooled analysis
showing fewer complications with Relenza. Notably, Jefferson et al. [8] have pointed out the exact same contradictory claims in the labels for Tamiflu
CI confidence interval, HR high risk, IP influenza positive, ITT intention-to-treat
Mulinari and Davis Health Research Policy and Systems  (2017) 15:93 Page 5 of 14
with the view codified in subsequent FDA guidance doc-
uments on anti-influenza drugs [23].
When DAVP asked GW to explain the negative results
in the North American trial, the company responded that
the North American study should be viewed not as
negative but as less positive. GW’s main argument was
that effects approached statistical significance (P = 0.078;
Table 1). However, this reasoning did not convince the
DAVP statistics team leader who noted that, while P =
0.078 might be interpreted as a “trend in the right direc-
tion” ([24], p. 1), independent analyses by Dr Elashoff
using alternative statistical tests or endpoints showed this
interpretation to be inappropriate as this trend was not
replicated in most analyses, and therefore could not be
regarded as robust [22]. The DAVP’s position followed,
therefore, from their independent statistical analysis that
went beyond the manufacturer’s analyses.
Additionally, GW collated a summary list of “statisti-
cally significant results in favour of zanamivir” from the
North American trial that, the company argued, were
supportive of a therapeutic effect in this trial ([20], p.
18–9). This list comprised evaluations on a number of
secondary endpoints (some retrospectively defined), in-
cluding cough, time with fever, average maximum daily
temperature, investigator’s assessment of symptoms
post-treatment and complications of influenza. However,
Dr Styrt, who reviewed this new submission, was uncon-
vinced about the statistical and clinical relevance of
these secondary analyses. In her view, any statistically
significant results in favour of Relenza from the North
American trial needed to be assessed in the context of
the multiple hypothesis testing performed and the risk
of spurious findings, and in relation to results obtained
in the other, clearly positive studies. Dr Styrt therefore
concluded: “the usefulness of this P value for ascribing
importance to a small proportion of the large number of
secondary analyses appeared limited” ([20], p. 19).
An alternative way of analysing the data – which, as
we discuss in detail below, was endorsed by the Swedish
regulator – would have been to pool efficacy data from
the three pivotal trials. Notably, pooling would have
‘cancelled out’ the negative North American study while
simultaneously producing a statistically significant over-
all effect of 1.5 days in the pooled IP population (and 1.0
day in the ITT population).
However, at an early point in the appraisal process, the
DAVP turned down offers by GW to pool efficacy data on
the grounds that independent assessment by DAVP
reviewers showed there to be “too much statistical and
clinical heterogeneity to justify this approach” ([20], p. 144)
– consistent with the establishment of company-
independent opinions among reviewers regarding the
appropriate way to analyse and interpret trials. For
example, according to Dr Elashoff, there was empiric
evidence that the efficacy in the foreign studies could not
be extrapolated to the United States population as he
could show a statistically significant treatment-by-study
interaction, suggesting that the disparate trial results were
unlikely to be random fluctuations but represented real
differences [22]. Furthermore, Dr Elashoff noted how
there was a sensible explanation for the disparate results,
namely that use of relief medication was almost twice as
high in the negative North American study compared to
the clearly positive European study, with the Southern
Hemisphere study laying in between [22].
Similarly, Dr Styrt’s clinical review drew attention to the
fact that the European study “appeared uniquely isolated at
the particularly high effect estimate”, and therefore argued
it would be inappropriate to combine results with other
studies ([20], p. 144). Moreover, her report said the
Southern Hemisphere study differed from the North
American and European studies in too many respects,
“most notably the lack of an objective temperature cri-
terion for entry, the requirement that symptoms be
present for no more than 36 hours at entry, use of dif-
ferent direct tests for influenza diagnosis…and a
shorter duration of symptom recording” ([20], p. 13)
(in the Southern Hemisphere study symptom recoding
was not continued beyond the first 2 weeks).
The DAVP reviewers concluded that, taken together,
this level of statistical and clinical heterogeneity meant
pooling would likely result in misleading estimates of
treatment effects and their level of confidence, especially
in relation to the United States population. Efficacy ap-
praisal was, therefore, to be based on analysing each study
separately. Notably, in advancing this argument, DAVP re-
viewers aligned themselves with existing agency thinking
regarding the pooling of efficacy data [25], which, in turn,
were based on influential tripartite (United States, Euro-
pean Union and Japan) International Congress on Har-
monisation regulatory guidelines regarding statistical
analyses of clinical trials [26]. Specifically, whilst acknow-
ledging the potential value of combining results from
similar trials for improving precision in estimation of ef-
fects, FDA guidance emphasised that pooling should be
pre-specified (as opposed to retrospective, as in the
present case), and that “attention should be paid…to the
homogeneity of their [the trials’] results, and to the proper
modelling of the various sources of variation” ([25], p. 39).
Thus, why did the FDA approve Relenza despite re-
viewers’ negative opinions on the product’s proven effi-
cacy in the United States population? An opinion
mirrored by a distinctly negative recommendation by
the DAVP’s own Advisory Committee [27], whose mem-
bers voted 13-4 against recommending approval. Space
constraints do not allow us to go into the details (but
see authors, forthcoming), but one important argument
was “the public health need” for a new anti-influenza
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drug in light of the risk of viral resistance developing
against available products (rimantidine and amantadine)
[28]. However, because of lingering concerns about
Relenza’s efficacy in the United States population, the
FDA inserted two important qualifications in the label,
namely (1) that results in the North American study
were not statistically significant, and (2) that the magni-
tude of treatment effect varied between studies, with
possible relationships to the amount of relief medication
used (Table 3).
The MPA’s position
Dr Ingrid Uhnoo, an MPA infectious disease expert, eval-
uated the clinical part of the Relenza submission. Like the
DAVP medical reviewer, Dr Uhnoo considered the IP
population most relevant for efficacy evaluation since this
tested the drug’s effect on the biological disease [29]. Fur-
thermore, Dr Uhnoo’s overall valuation of trial results was
akin to DAVP’s assessment. She had few concerns regard-
ing the Southern Hemisphere and European studies re-
sults, but viewed the North American study as essentially
negative. However, unlike the DAVP statisticians, she did
accept that there were some “trends in favour of zanami-
vir” in the North American trial ([30], p. 15).
Notably, and in sharp contrast to FDA appraisals, the
MPA did not (and still do not) generally conduct statis-
tical re-analyses of data sets (written communication to
author: Ingrid Landberg, Director of Efficacy and Safety
Unit at MPA, November 2016). Nor did the MPA nor-
mally involve a statistician in the primary review, al-
though a statistician sat on the agency’s Board that
reviewed all MPA expert assessments (author interview
with Senior MPA Statistician). This followed MPA
standard operating procedure, consistent with the insti-
tutionalisation of a less probing review methodology
compared to the FDA. A consequence of this was that
the MPA, in evaluating Relenza, did not, for example,
check the statistical robustness of results, conduct ex-
ploratory analyses or test for treatment-by-study inter-
action, as DAVP had done. In addition, MPA’s clinical
review was also significantly less exhaustive than DAVP’s
evaluation (see below).
Notwithstanding its more superficial review, the MPA’s
clinical assessment resulted in 42 questions that GW
was asked to respond to [30]. With respect to efficacy,
two questions pertained to the negative North American
study results, which, the MPA stated, “need to be ana-
lysed in depth” ([30], p. 33).
GW’s response mirrored their response to the DAVP;
the company did not view the North American study as
negative, “but as less strongly positive than the other piv-
otal studies” ([31], p. 31). To support this contention,
GW submitted, as they did to the DAVP, a list of ‘sec-
ondary measures of efficacy’ from the North American
study displaying statistically significant treatment bene-
fits favouring Relenza. With respect to explaining out-
come differences between the North American study
and the other studies, GW commented that, “Any con-
sistent differences in observed efficacy are more likely to
be due to cultural differences in symptom reporting and
relief medication use” ([30], p. 33).
However, unlike the DAVP medical reviewer who had
thoroughly scrutinised and criticised GW’s explanations, the
MPA assessor appears to have been uninterested or unable
to pursue the issue further, and wrote: “The applicant has
satisfactory [sic] analysed the results of study NAIA3002
[North American study] and the potential determining
factors for the decreased treatment response observed” ([32],
p. 2). The ‘point’ was thus considered “resolved, although no
new data to explain the difference in efficacy outcome of
study NAIA3002 were submitted” ([30], p. 33).
Once the issue of the inconclusive North American
study was judged to be ‘resolved’, the MPA went on to
formally conclude that, overall, the evidence showed that
Relenza alleviated symptoms of influenza 1–2.5 days
quicker than placebo, which justified marketing author-
isation [30]. This implied that the MPA – in agreement
with GW [19] – saw results from the three trials as
representing a range of expected effects (i.e. 1, 1.5 and
2.5 days, respectively). Importantly, this interpretation
diverged from the DAVP’s position that there was too
much statistical and clinical heterogeneity to permit
such a generalisation.
The evidence suggests, therefore, that the issue of inter-
trial heterogeneity, for example, related to differential fre-
quency of relief medication use, did not overtly trouble
the Swedish regulator, at least not so as to preclude com-
bining efficacy data from different studies. As further evi-
dence of this – and despite Dr Uhnoo conceding that
“there were some differences between trials in inclusion cri-
teria with respect to age, duration of influenza symptoms
at entry and also to the definitions of absence of fever”
([30], p. 8) – she concluded that pooling was justified be-
cause of the similarities between studies ([33], p. 33). Sub-
sequently, in 2001, and on the basis of the MPA assessor’s
recommendations, European regulators allowed GW to
include in the Europe-wide product label the results from
a pooled efficacy analysis, showing a statistically conclu-
sive effect of 1.5 days in the IP population, alongside
results from the individual studies (Table 3) [33].
It is important to note that this pooling of efficacy data
was not only incongruent with the FDA’s position, but was
also incongruent with the official European Medicines
Agency’s (EMA) bio-statistical guidelines from 2001 [31].
According to these guidelines – which, like the FDA guid-
ance, drew on International Conference on Harmonisation
guidelines [26] – retrospective pooling “should be avoided”
([31], p. 2). Furthermore, EMA guidelines specified that
Mulinari and Davis Health Research Policy and Systems  (2017) 15:93 Page 7 of 14
pooling should not be used to reconcile conflicting results
from positive and negative studies. In ‘exceptional situa-
tions’ retrospective pooling could be allowed (because
“meta-analysis seems to be the only way to provide reliable
proof of efficacy”), but regulatory prerequisites included,
among other things, “no statistically significant heterogen-
eity” between trials and “inconclusive studies showing posi-
tive trends in the primary variable” ([31], p. 3), which was
arguably not the case for Relenza trials.
At the same time, it should be emphasised that the
MPA’s decision to approve Relenza was not based on this
pooled analysis. Rather, pooling had implications for how
results were conveyed in the labelling. Nevertheless, to-
gether with the evidence presented below, the tolerance
towards retrospective pooling and the apparent disregard
for inter-trial heterogeneity suggests a tendency on the
part of the MPA to depart from prevailing regulatory stan-
dards when interpreting the drug’s beneficial effects.
Efficacy in high-risk groups
The FDA’s position
The DAVP were unimpressed by the drug’s efficacy in HR-
IP patients (e.g. the elderly and patients with certain
chronic disorders) and reviewers highlighted numerous
problematic issues related to the studies’ design, conduct
and results. As with efficacy in the IP group as a whole,
statistical heterogeneity between trials was considered a
problem for interpreting results in the HR-IP group [20]. A
particular concern was that, whilst point estimates of time
to symptom alleviation were shorter with Relenza (albeit
not statistically significant) in the European and Southern
Hemisphere trials, in the North American study, which had
recruited the largest number of HR-IP patients, this group
did numerically worse with Relenza (–0.25 days) (Table 1).
DAVP also highlighted how the definition of ‘high-risk’
differed between studies, potentially creating important
clinical heterogeneity between studies. Specifically, only
in the Southern Hemisphere study were HR categories
defined to include metabolic/endocrine disorders and
immune compromised patients in addition to those with
chronic respiratory and cardiovascular disease (Table 4)
([20], p. 31). Moreover, reviews of individual patient case
report forms by DAVP staff suggested that, even within
studies, “high-risk definitions might in some instances be
applied differently by different investigators, so that uni-
formity in the average severity of underlying disease of
these subgroups in different studies could not be assumed
with confidence” ([20], p. 49). In sum, Dr Styrt’s medical
review concluded that “results for the ‘high risk’ subgroup
may require some caution in interpretation” ([20], p. 39).
Besides concerns about differences in enrolment cri-
teria and definitions across and within trials, DAVP staff
worried that the HR group included subjects with quite
distinct risk factors that “cannot be assumed to have a
uniform effect on the course of influenza or its response
to treatment” ([20], p. 49). One way of addressing this
issue would have been to analyse results in HR-IP sub-
groups (e.g. chronic respiratory disease) by retrospect-
ively pooling data from several studies to increase
statistical power. However, according to Dr Styrt, this
was inappropriate as detailed examination of results and
trial protocols showed “there was not enough consistency
across studies to suggest that pooled analyses could be
used with confidence” ([20], p. 54).
Relatedly, DAVP rejected GW’s suggestion to pool the
results from all HR-IP individuals. GW presented a
treatment-by-study interaction analysis with a P value of
0.128 as a demonstration that “there is no specific contra-
indication to pooled…analysis, across protocols” ([20], p.
119). However, this argument was rejected by DAVP on
the grounds that “the absence of a statistical interaction
is not generally considered to prove homogeneity across
studies, especially in the context of the many differences
between studies…” ([20], p. 119).
In sum, DAVP concluded that there was no compelling
evidence of efficacy in the HR-IP population due to the
small, inconclusive differences (generally favouring
Relenza), and the substantial statistical and clinical
Table 4 Median days to alleviation in high-risk subgroups
Trial Southern Hemisphere
(NAIB3001)
Europe
(NAIB3002)
North America
(NAIA3002)
Elderly n = 9 n = 12 n = 37
Placebo 13 > 26.5 7.25
Relenza 2.75 11 4.5
Differencea 10.25 > 15.5 2.75
Cardiovascular n = 3 n = 6 n = 19
Placebo 8.5 16.5 7
Relenza 1.5 21 7.5
Differencea 7.0 –4.5 –0.5
Respiratory n = 41 n = 17 n = 36
Placebo 7 10.75 5.5
Relenza 5.5 6.5 8.75
Differencea 1.5 4.25 –3.25
Endocrine/
metabolic
n = 6 N/A N/A
Placebo 13
Relenza 4
Differencea 9
Immune
compromised
n=2 N/A N/A
Placebo 4.5
Relenza 3
Differencea 1.5
a Differences are statistically non-significant
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heterogeneity. It is important to note how this view
followed from DAVP’s meticulous and detailed engagement
with the quantitative and qualitative facets of trials.
The MPA’s position
Like the DAVP, the MPA assessor, Dr Uhnoo, lamented the
small number of HR-IP patients recruited, noted the statistically
inconclusive results in this group across trials, and expressed
concerns that, in the North American study, which had re-
cruited the largest number of high-risk subjects, Relenza pa-
tients fared worse than patients on placebo [30]. She did not,
however, further explore the underlying clinical heterogeneity
(for example, by examining patient case report forms to ensure
consistency in the definition of ‘high-risk’ within and across
trials) as was done by the DAVP [30].
Moreover – and again unlike the DAVP team – she
seemed inclined to view the evidence as supporting effi-
cacy in HR-IP patients, noting that the evidence “is consid-
ered very limited, but do indicate treatment benefit” ([32],
p. 3). Dr Uhnoo also referred to “ongoing studies in the
high risk patients”, which would “probably clarify this
issue” ([30], p. 35). However, rather than wait for comple-
tion of those studies to resolve remaining uncertainties,
the MPA concluded that “Results suggest a slightly more
pronounced effect [in the high risk group] on the duration
of illness with an average shortening of 2.5 days (variation
2.25-3.25 days)” ([34], p. 7). It is important to note that
these point estimates referred to the results in the
Southern Hemisphere and European studies (P = 0.16 and
P = 0.21, respectively), but disregarded the negative point
estimate in the North American study. Thus, the MPA
seemed willing to give the drug (and the manufacturer)
significant benefit of the doubt with respect to proving ef-
ficacy in the HR-IP group, despite recognising the paucity
of data and the statistically inconclusive results – some of
which actually favoured placebo.
The MPA took a similarly permissive approach when
it accepted GW’s retrospective analyses of HR-IP patient
subgroups (e.g. chronic respiratory disease), despite this
involving multiple analyses, each with a small number of
patients, where apparent efficacy differences might easily
arise due to chance. Thus, the original Swedish Relenza
label from March 1999, written by GW and approved by
the MPA, contained the following statement:
“In some studies, a more pronounced treatment effect
has been seen in patients that belong to the risk group
of elderly patients (≤65 years) and patients with
certain chronic disorders in heart and lungs, although
only a limited number of patients in these risk groups
have been evaluated.”
The claim that Relenza exhibited “a more pronounced
treatment effect” on the elderly appears to refer to the
positive, but statistically inconclusive, point estimate
in elderly subjects in each of the pivotal trials
(Table 4). By contrast, it is difficult to understand
how the statement that Relenza showed “a more pro-
nounced treatment effect in patients with heart and
lung disorders” was derived since point estimates for
the high risk cardiovascular group in two out of three
phase III studies favoured placebo. In fact, this claim
was subsequently removed from the drug’s label, and
was not present in the European harmonised label
(Table 3), which suggests it was removed during ne-
gotiations with other European regulators on how the
drug’s properties should be conveyed.
Nevertheless, in 2001, the European label was updated
with a statement that efficacy had been demonstrated
for certain high risk groups – a claim that has remained
in European labels (Table 3). The basis for this new
claim was a novel trial, NAI3008, which showed a statis-
tically significant reduction of 1.5 days on the duration
of influenza symptoms in IP patients with mild to mod-
erate chronic respiratory disease [33]. Interestingly, there
is no evidence from publicly available documents that
GW similarly submitted results from NAI3008 to the
FDA with the purpose of updating the United States
label. Indeed, to this day, FDA maintains that no treat-
ment effect has been demonstrated in patients with
underlying chronic medical conditions, including re-
spiratory disease (Table 3).
GW also hoped to include a new claim in the Euro-
pean Union product label that Relenza benefited patients
across all HR-IP subgroups, and therefore submitted a
pooled efficacy analysis of HR-IP patients from the now
four principal trials (i.e. NAI30008 plus the original three)
demonstrating an overall reduction in duration of influ-
enza symptoms in HR-IP patients (1.5 days difference, P =
0.005) [33]. As the ‘reference country’ in the European
Union, the MPA continued to serve as the evaluating
agency with Dr Unhoo as the assessor. According to her
understanding, the pooled analyses provided further sup-
port of efficacy in HR-IP patients. However, she also noted
that significant efficacy was not demonstrated in the small
subgroup of elderly patients, where a pooled analysis failed
to reach statistical significance [33]. This contradicted
earlier statements approved in labelling (see above). GW’s
position on this issue, however, was that “it is not practic-
able to perform clinical studies to demonstrate efficacy
(with statistical significance) in all conceivable patient
sub-groups” ([33], p. 36). Rather, they argued, “a
consistency of effect has been demonstrated, from which it
is reasonable to assume efficacy across sub-groups” ([33],
p. 36). Nevertheless, this argument did not persuade the
MPA assessor, who noted that efficacy analysis from an
on-going study (NAI30012) in the elderly population “is
awaited before a conclusive statement could be made”
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([33], p. 36). It is interesting to note how this attitude of
requiring statistically conclusive results, and of not accept-
ing claims to efficacy prior to the completion of on-going
studies, differed from the MPA’s earlier permissive regula-
tory attitude, perhaps suggesting learning from past
experiences.
Unfortunately for GW, and further contradicting of
MPA’s initial statement that Relenza would work better
on elderly patients, study NAI30012 failed to demon-
strate a beneficial treatment effect. Consequently, since
2001, labelling in the European Union has cited the posi-
tive effects asthma/chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease patients derived from study NAI30008, but
simultaneously noted that efficacy has not been estab-
lished in elderly patients.
Complications of influenza
The FDA’s position
To this day, FDA maintains that the evidence submitted
to them does not prove a beneficial effect of Relenza on
the incidence of complications. In reaching this judg-
ment, the DAVP team pointed to the same kind of tech-
nical and methodological issues that had troubled
reviewers with regard to effects in the HR-IP group, i.e.
the small, inconclusive results (generally favouring
Relenza) alongside important heterogeneity, which con-
traindicated pooling [20].
In addition, DAVP argued the trials were not individu-
ally powered to demonstrate differences, as the percentage
of subjects categorised as experiencing complications was
relatively low (Table 2). The one study in which complica-
tions in the IP population were ‘significantly’ less frequent
with Relenza was the otherwise negative North American
study (P = 0.049; Table 2). However, as we have seen,
DAVP did not trust any ‘significant’ finding from the
North America trial because of the problems of multipli-
city and the lack of consistency in analyses [20].
Furthermore, Dr Styrt noted that there appeared to be
differences in how complications were recorded across
studies [20]. For example, detailed DAVP analyses of pa-
tient case report forms showed that check-boxes used for
recording events were not uniform across trials. Another
concern was the “disparate components of the ‘complica-
tion’ definition” ([20], p. 49); in particular, that “some com-
plications of influenza (such as pneumonia or respiratory
failure) would usually be regarded as more serious than
others (such as sinusitis or pharyngitis)” ([20], p. 46).
Therefore, Dr Styrt argued, it was reasonable to examine
occurrence of individual types of complications in
addition to the aggregate analysis, but, unfortunately,
“numbers were small for any individual complication type
and no firm conclusion could be derived with regard to ei-
ther increases or decreases in specific complications associ-
ated with treatment assignment” ([20], p. 48).
The MPA’s position
Like DAVP reviewers, the MPA assessor acknowledged
that studies were not individually powered to demonstrate
conclusive results on complications. Nonetheless, as with
effects in HR-IP patients, she seemed inclined to view the
totality of results as still providing adequate evidence of
effect, albeit without exploring to any great extent the het-
erogeneity in trials, for example, by looking at instructions
for how complications were recorded [30, 33].
While the alleged evidence of a beneficial effect was
not considered sufficiently strong or important to merit
mentioning in the original Swedish label, the MPA’s
lengthier product monograph (a post-authorisation sum-
mary text aimed at health professionals) included the
following description of effects on complications:
“The most common complications were bronchitis,
sinusitis and otitis media, which in one study were
significantly less frequent with zanamivir treatment.
Overall in the Phase III trials, the complication rate
was lower and there was less use of antibiotics in
patients treated with zanamivir compared with
placebo” [35].
Notably, the one study in which “complications…were
significantly less frequent” [35] with Relenza was the
otherwise negative North America study, hence adding
to the evidence of a less stringent attitude towards statis-
tics from the Swedish regulator compared to the DAVP.
Regarding the second claim of an overall reduction in
complication rate and antibiotics use, this judgment was
based on a pooled analysis conducted by GW ([36], p.
15–6). Indeed, in 2000, the MPA agreed to recommend
updating the European label with the results of this
pooled analysis showing statistically significant reduc-
tions in complications (29% vs. 22%; P = 0.004) and use
of antibiotics (19% vs. 14%, P = 0.021), compared to pla-
cebo ([33], p. 34). Thus, as with the labelling decisions
regarding Relenza’s effect on time with influenza symp-
toms, divergent regulatory interpretations of Relenza’s
effects on complications boiled down to judgments on
whether pooling of efficacy data was appropriate or not.
Explaining regulatory divergence
The immediate explanation for these divergent regula-
tory interpretations of Relenza’s efficacy was that DAVP,
but not MPA, rejected the pooling of efficacy data,
remained wary of subgroup analyses and insisted on
stringent statistical analyses. Notably, in comparison to
the DAVP, the MPA repeatedly took a more permissive
approach, and was more likely to depart from prevailing
regulatory and scientific standards with respect to the
evaluation of the design, conduct, analysis and interpret-
ation of the data. For example, the MPA displayed a
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greater willingness to depart from established scientific
interpretive norms by accepting subgroup analyses
within the HR-IP group and a ‘significant’ effect on com-
plications in the North American study despite the well-
known risks of spurious associations with multiple
hypothesis testing [37]. The MPA, and by extension
other European regulators accepting the MPA’s assess-
ment, also allowed themselves to deviate from joint Euro-
pean Union regulatory standards [31], for example, with
respect to GW’s retrospective pooling of efficacy data.
However, why did regulators’ methods and criteria dif-
fer in this way? Our analysis suggests links between
regulatory outcomes (in the form of divergent product
labelling) on the one hand and, on the other, regulatory
resources, disciplinary expertise and institutionalised re-
view methodologies and practices. Thus, DAVP bene-
fited from having greater resources, which included a
review team made-up of statistical and clinical reviewers
who had sufficient time and the multi-disciplinary ex-
pertise required to conduct critical, in-depth assess-
ments. This allowed its reviewers to collectively develop
‘deep’ knowledge [38] concerning the clinical and statis-
tical facets of trials, and informed opinions regarding
suitable methods for analysing trial results.
By contrast, the single, clinical assessor for the MPA did
not perform independent statistical analyses of raw data
or cross check various definitions and their application
within and between trials. Instead, she relied largely on
summary tables of data and reports compiled by the drug’s
sponsor, resulting in a more superficial understanding of
the evidence pertaining, for example, to differences in
how study definitions of ‘risk’ or ‘complications’ were ap-
plied. Arguably, this superficial understanding weakened
the MPA assessor’s ability to challenge the manufacturer’s
proposed methods for analysing results (i.e. pooling, sub-
group analyses) or problematic interpretations of the data
(e.g. that the North American trial showed a conclusive ef-
fect on complications). It may also have encouraged a
more permissive regulatory approach – a permissiveness
that is perhaps most evident in the MPA’s acceptance of
GW’s claim that patients with cardiovascular disease bene-
fited from Relenza, when results in two out of three stud-
ies actually favoured placebo.
Alongside these important differences in regulators’
methodologies and conclusions, our analysis also points
to similarities. The elephant in the room was whether
judgments were to be derived from results in the ITT or
IP populations and, related to this, how to deal with the
abnormally high number of IP patients in trials (over
70%). Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic concurred
with the company that the IP population was most rele-
vant for efficacy evaluation, since this tested the drug’s
effects on the disease. By contrast, some researchers [38]
and Health Technology Assessment agencies [4] have
argued that, from a public health perspective, results in
the ITT population provide a better, albeit still inflated,
approximation of efficacy, since this population is more
similar to the real-world patient population.
Yet, we argue that, even from the regulators’ perspec-
tive, to rely on results from the IP population was ques-
tionable since the drug was intended for patients with
influenza-like symptoms, rather than only those infected
by influenza virus. Furthermore, since the label constitutes
the factual basis for drug marketing, emphasising effects
in the IP population in the label meant regulators
authorised the use of these estimates in marketing. How
this might be a problem became evident after the MPA’s
unit for drug information, tasked with overseeing drug
marketing, complained to the Swedish pharmaceutical
industry’s self-regulatory body governing drug promotion
[39] about a promotional claim that Relenza shortens the
time of illness by 1–2.5 days compared to placebo. MPA’s
objection was that the claim could mislead doctors since
efficacy is likely inferior in clinical practice where the pro-
portion of IP patients is typically low [40]. Tellingly, GW
successfully challenged the MPA allegation on the
grounds that their marketing material simply conveyed in-
formation approved by MPA in labelling.
Discussion
The importance of ‘deep’ product reviews
Our observation that the MPA relied largely on summaries
written by the sponsor whilst the DAVP conducted a more
thorough assessment, including independent examination
of trial documentation and statistical analysis of raw data,
is not unique to this case but has been noted in previous
social scientific studies of the FDA and national and supra-
national drug regulatory agencies in the European Union
[41, 42]. One important insight emerging from this body of
work is that the FDA and European regulators have devel-
oped very different review methodologies – enabled and
constrained, in turn, by different levels of funding and
agency resources. These diverse review methodologies
are rooted in distinct institutional cultures and histor-
ies [42–45], and continue to be relevant, judging from
a recent report by the Swedish National Audit Office
alleging that the MPA – the agency that in 2015 han-
dled the largest number of EMA evaluations – lacks
resources and displays an inappropriate trust in man-
ufacturers’ data analyses [46].
It is important to acknowledge that European
regulators’ less probing evaluative methodology does not
always translate into permissive regulation and, con-
versely, that FDA’s ‘deep’ review does not always ensure
a precautionary approach [41]. Nevertheless, the FDA’s
greater attention to the qualitative and statistical facets
of trials, and reviewers’ sceptical attitude towards pool-
ing and multiple hypothesis testing, meant that the
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United States regulators consistently approved more
conservative, and arguably more accurate, Relenza label-
ling statements than European regulators. Thus, our
analysis shows that FDA reviewers’ more comprehensive
evaluation meant that they were more able, and willing,
to challenge problematic company analyses.
This finding has important implications for on-going
policy debates – particularly in the United States – relat-
ing to the speed of regulatory review. Following decades
of criticism by the pharmaceutical industry and
industry-funded think-tanks that the FDA was overly
slow and bureaucratic [47], the agency now boasts some
of the fastest drug review times in the world, as evi-
denced by comparative studies in the medical and policy
literature by researchers attempting to defend the FDA
from further attempts to whittle down Congress-
mandated regulatory review times [48–50]. However, as
one United States patient group commented, and as our
analysis demonstrates, regulatory ‘success’ should not be
measured solely by the rapidity of an agency’s review
process but, rather, “by the completeness and scientific
soundness of its work” ([47], p. 62). Thus, one of the les-
sons of the Relenza case is that adequate resources and
an institutional culture conducive to a critical and rigor-
ous regulatory science are as, if not more, important
than meeting strict review deadlines. Moreover, analyses
that compare different agencies’ overall review times
may not reflect the actual time that reviewers are en-
gaged in scrutinising company submissions. Policy de-
bates and academic research comparing FDA and EMA
timelines may inadvertently put pressure on the EMA to
further reduce the time assessors spend reviewing mar-
keting authorisation applications, with potentially nega-
tive impacts on public health.
Upgrading the public health role of regulatory science
We have shown that the FDA’s probing and meticulous
review practices in the case of Relenza resulted in ‘deep’
knowledge of the clinical and statistical aspects of the
existing evidence base for the drug and, arguably, a more
accurate picture of the nature and magnitude of its
health benefits. Such knowledge is a valuable asset, but
this asset can only be realised if the information is
widely communicated to and understood by the public
health community [51]. Yet, a striking and constant fea-
ture of the conflicting meta-analyses and heated contro-
versies concerning the usefulness, cost-effectiveness and
stockpiling of NIs has been the determined lack of en-
gagement by national and supranational drug regulatory
agencies in these public debates.
To illustrate this, one can point to the fact that, after
researchers ‘discovered’ regulatory assessments differed
between countries yet were unable to explain the reason
for these divergences [2], neither the FDA, the MPA,
nor the EMA made their positions sufficiently clear. In-
deed, as debates in the medical literature raged on, a pecu-
liarity of these disagreements was that protagonists on
both sides referred to the FDA’s judgment to substantiate
conflicting positions. Thus, Jefferson et al. of the Cochrane
collaboration [8] stress that their meta-analyses of all pre-
and post-marketing trials confirm the FDA’s conservative
conclusions, whilst Monto et al. [52] – promoting the use
of NIs to reduce the risk of complications – cite the FDA
to support their view that efficacy should be evaluated in
the IP population. None of these authors refer to the
FDA’s refusal to accept pooled efficacy data. Instead, and
despite important differences between these various meta-
analyses, a common feature is that they combine pre- and
post-marketing (i.e. phase I-IV) trials of variable quality,
that display even greater heterogeneity [8] than the three,
phase III studies that the DAVP found sufficiently hetero-
geneous to argue against pooling. Open discussion of the
agency’s position with respect to pooling was thus a crit-
ical, but missing, part of the debate – something the FDA
did nothing to correct.
Doshi [51] has recently argued that regulators are in a
unique position with respect to their detailed understand-
ing of the quality and quantity of the evidence base for new
drugs, and points to a number of cases in which regulatory
knowledge existed to challenge inappropriate reporting of
trial data in the medical literature. A further example, not
referenced by Doshi, is a pooled analysis in the New
England Journal of Medicine in 1997 of two phase II studies
for Relenza (NAIA2005 and NAIB2005), which states that
the definition of illness included “the presence of fever” in
both trials [53]. However, when these trials were submitted
to the FDA for review, DAVP reviewers, unlike the MPA
assessor [30], dismissed pooling because their investigation
of original clinical study reports and protocol material had
unearthed important differences between trials, including
different inclusion criteria for ‘fever’ in studies and partly
different laboratory methods for confirming influenza ([20],
p. 64), and because the analysis involved multiple
hypothesis testing ([20], p. 70).
This discussion, then, raises important policy questions,
not only about the most effective practices and methods of
regulatory science, but also about the public health role of
regulators and what that role should entail. In 2009, the
new Commissioner of the FDA wrote in the New England
Journal of Medicine that establishing the FDA as a public
health agency required the organisation to communicate
“frequently and clearly about risks and benefits”, “provide
the data on which it bases its regulatory decisions… and
explain its decision-making process to the public” and foster
“a culture that encourages scientific exchange” [54]. Just a
few months later, a paper in the British Medical Journal
described the maze of contradictory statements about NI’s
efficacy made by researchers, industry, regulators and other
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public bodies [2]. Yet, regulatory bodies failed to engage in
a ‘scientific exchange’ in 2009, nor did they enter the fray in
2014 when the controversy erupted again after the
Cochrane collaboration published meta-analyses of all
Relenza and Tamiflu trials showing that that the drugs’ effi-
cacy had been much overstated, in part because of major
reporting and publication biases [8].
We would argue that persistent uncertainties and
knowledge deficits regarding NIs could have been ame-
liorated had regulators explained their contrasting meth-
odologies and judgments (in addition to making all the
raw data available from submitted trials [2]). Had regula-
tors, and particularly the FDA, effectively disseminated
their gained knowledge about the qualitative and statis-
tical facets of trials alongside their methodological delib-
erations, this would most likely have improved the
synthesis and critical appraisal of the clinical evidence by
the broader medical community [38]. That being said,
the broader medical community, including authors of re-
search papers and systematic reviews, journal editors
and reviewers, and clinicians, must also accept some re-
sponsibility for the underutilisation of the regulatory re-
views that have been readily available. Regulators use
important economic and intellectual resources to evalu-
ate drugs, but if regulators’ appraisals and methodologies
are not effectively disseminated and used this means that
resources are used inefficiently, as has evidently been the
case for NIs.
Conclusion
The FDA’s more comprehensive evaluative methodology
resulted in a ‘deeper’ understanding of the Relenza clin-
ical evidence. Our findings challenge the current em-
phasis on evaluating regulatory performance mainly in
terms of speed of review. Furthermore, had regulators
explained their contrasting assessments, this could have
improved the broader medical community’s critical ap-
praisal of the evidence base for anti-influenza drugs.
Regulators use major resources to evaluate new medi-
cines, but if regulators’ assessments are not effectively
disseminated and used, resources are wasted.
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